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PREFACE

In this period of disillusion with government's ability to anticipate important policy problems,
the creation of the Commission demonstrates that the legislative process can foresee policy
issues of widespread importance and impact to the people of California, address those issues
in a timely and deliberative manner and involve a diverse group of Californians in the governmental process.

A full thirteen years after its passage, the Commission recognizes the intense public
sentiment which continues to surround Proposition 13; One of the most frequently heard
refrains from Commission observers was an amazement that the Senate, a body of elected
officials, would even put a study of Proposition 13 on the public agenda. The Senate's
willingness to reexamine the property tax system established by Proposition 13 is a measure
of its public policy co:inmitment.
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INTRODUCTION

The Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue was established by Senate Resolution
42 (authored by State Senator Gary K. Hart), enacted by the Senate on March 15, 1990. Appointment of the Commission membership was completed by the Senate Rules Committee on
June 13, 1990. On January 18, 1991, the Senate enacted Senate Resolution 8 (Hart), extending the Commission's tenure until June 30, 1991.
Appendix A contains copies of Senate Resolutions 42 and 8. Appendix B contains a roster of
Commissioners and their respective affiliations at the t;ime of Senate Rules Committee appointment.
The Commission adopted a monthly meeting schedule. Commission meeting were structured
as roundtable briefings at which tax experts, state officials, legislative staff, academic
scholars, local government representatives and citizen organizations were invited to make
presentations to the Commission and spend the day in active dialogue with Commissioners
and other presenters. Prior to each meeting, Commissioners were supplied with extensive
background readings.
Appendix C contains a schedule of Commission meetings and topics. Appendix D contains a
roster of individuals who made presentations to the Commission.
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CHAPTER I:
COMMISSION RECOMMEJ.VDATIONS

The Commission finds that the way property is assessed
under Article XIIIA of the California Constitution has
generated substantial inequities for property taxpayers.
Under Article XIIIA, property in California is reassessed to fair
market value only upon sale (or in the event of new construction).
During the intervening years between sales, the property can be
reassessed upwards by a maximum of two percent each year.
Assessing property on the basis of acquisition value rather than
market value produces side-by-side inequities such that taxpayers
with identical properties may pay different property taxes due
solely to the date the property was purchased.
The Commission further notes that over time the property tax assessment system does not self-correct or equalize the tax burden
among taxpayers in any orderly, systematic way. In fact, dis parities have widened over time and will continue to widen so long as
property values rise faster than the two percent annual reappraisal cap.
The Commission does recognize that the two percent reassessment cap has two beneficial, and noteworthy, outcomes. One,
owners of property are afforded a measure of certainty in anticipating future property tax bills. Every property owner knows that
his or her property tax bill cannot rise more than two percent per
year for as long as he or she owns the property.
The second important benefit is that the property tax system does
not tax unrealized capital gains (beyond the limitation of the two
percent cap). In effect, the property tax system has been disengaged, for the most part, from the volatility of California's real
estate market. Property owners enjoy a stable tax levy over the
course of property ownership.
The policy issue is whether these two taxpayer benefits justify the
inequities resulting from the present property tax system. Reasonable people disagree on this question.
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The Commission concludes that, on balance, a
ation system is more reasonable than an acquisition
tem provided sufficient safeguards are in place to assure
that homeownership is protected.
The Commission recognizes that market valuation is
ability-to-pay system of taxation. However, market
a
closer approximation of the taxpayer's current economic capacity
to pay taxes relative to his or her neighbors than the acquisition
method of assessment which artificially taxes on the basis a
formula.
Property tax equity, like beauty, is in the eyes of the beholder,
is, the beholder ofhis or her tax bill. Generally speaking, property
taxpayers in California think Article XIIIA of the
Constitution (Proposition 13) with its constitutionally
low tax rate and capped annual reassessment is lovely indeed,
albeit unfair.
The Commission appreciates the political inertia which
rent provisions of Article XIIIA intrinsically create
politic. The new property owner may wince at learning
neighbor in an identical house pays 'significantly
taxes but the tax rate is one percent of assessed value,
less
than pre-Proposition 13levels, and, thanks to the reassessment
cap, she soon will be paying relatively less taxes as time passes.
For this reason many taxpayers are lulled into accepting an
inequitable tax structure.
But public content, even happiness, with a law does not make
law necessarily fair, equitable, effective or reasonable. The Commission finds three compelling reasons. to reexamine the state's
property tax structure and to recommend changes to it.
First, legal challenges to the assessment section of Article XIIIA
are being appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Commission
finds no legal consensus exists on the probability of the Court
ruling the reassessment section of Article XIIIA of the California
Constitution unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court has
agreed to hear one challenge and may decide on hearing another
later this year. A decision on constitutionality will be rendered
by June, 1992. Given the possibility the Court will strike down
California's current property tax assessment methodology, it is
prudent for the Legislature to formulate and develop a contingency plan.

2

Revenue

Second, the size of state budget deficit (estimated at $14 billion for
1991/92) and the financial difficulty confronting local government
invite a review of the
Article XIIIA constitutionally caps property tax
one
ofmarketvalue, but
under current assessment practices,
property in the state
pays less than
one
This erosion of the
property tax base contributes to the
strain experienced by
local government and its
The Commission's major recombut could easily be converted to
mendations are revenue
Other Commission recrevenue additions for local
ommendations, while advanced for reasons of equity and fairness,
are revenue positive.
Third, equity
existence of
operates unfairly is
a $17 billion tax system
reason enough to offer improvements to it.
Public opinion poll data show an overwhelming 70percent of Californians disapprove of current assessment practices once they are
explained in detail. 1
own experience and percepthe provisions of Article
tion, the Commission
XIIIA, including the
are popular with the
general public both symbolically and as a matter of economic selfinterest. The Commission concludes that people do not necessarily want an unfair system, but they dislike the property tax enough
to oppose paying more ofit to equalize the tax burden among property taxpayers.
The Commission recognizes that virtually every improvement in
the tax system, every firmly defended tax tradition, began as an innovation. Proposition 13 itself was such an innovation. The Commission believes these recommendations can lead to a better tax
structure for California taxpayers.
The Commission considered a wide range of proposals for restoring equity to the property tax system and for strengthening the
fiscal solvency oflocal government while protecting homeowners
from unpredictable tax increases. One class of options achieve
property tax equity by further reducing governmental reliance on
the property tax by extending the favored tax status of pre-1978
property owners to all property owners (or at least homeowners)
and replacing the lost governmental revenue with other taxes.
The Commission rejected this approach because it concluded that
the local property tax is an appropriate revenue source for financing local services and maintaining a measure of local control.

3
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TRANSITION
RECOMMENDATIONS
TO PROTECT
HOMEOWNERS

The Commission

unconstitutional.
If the Supreme
of Article
adopt an alternative,
methodology will revert
tax rate cap), causing over an
$5.3 billion of which would be
instance, the Commission nH.n.-ro
structures,
to a market

Recommendation
OnePhaseln to
Market Value
a)

until the property
four percent cap
year one, six percent in
eight percent year three, and so

two,

..,...".... ·"'·"........... revenue
each subsequent
sive oflocal bond service) on a county-by-county
a level which will generate an amount of revenue equal
to the prior year's revenue,
annually
in population and an
d) Provide
no nmne~ow1r1er
market value will
4
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have occurred under the acquisition method of assessment as a consequence of the interaction of(b) and (c);
e) Provide that local voters may change local tax rate caps
by a majority vote.
To protect current homeowners from sudden and large property
tax in:creases, the Commission recommends that the assessment
cap be gradually increased by two percent per year. In the first
year following enactment of this plan, existing homeowners' assessments could not be increased by more than four percent;
second year six percent; third year eight percent and so on or until
the homeowner's property is assessed at full market value.
The Commission does not believe that a return to market valuation must necessarily result in an overall increase in the property
tax burden and, accordingly, recommends that local government
tax rates be lowered by an amount approximately equal to the increased revenue derived from returning to market value assessments. A reasonable index to account for population changes and
inflation should be employed. An illustration of how this rate
adjustment would be made for a hypothetical county is shown
below:

Year 0- Base Year
Assessed Value
Tax Rate
Tax Levy

Assessed Value
Assessed Value
Owner Occupied Homes
Other

Assessed Value
Total

$4,000,000

$6,000,000

$10,000,000
1.00%
$100,000

$4,000,000
200,000
152,000

$6,000,000

$10,000,000

4,000,000
600.000
$10,600,000

152,000
4,000,000
1.000.000
$15,352,000

Year 1 - New System
Base Assessed Value
Ownership Changes
AV Adjustment - 4%
AV Adjustment to Market
New Construction
Total Assessed Value

400.000
$4,752,000

Tax Levy= Base Year Levy adjusted for population+ inflation,
(assumed to be 2% + 5%):$100,000 x 1.07 =

$107,000

Tax Rate = Total Tax Levy Divided by Total Assessed Value =

0.7%

Note: The total levy could be a<ljusted in the following year by the additional amounts levied on homeowners whose taxes would otherwise be lowered by this system.

5
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Since a tax rate reduction could cause some homeowners' property
tax bills to decrease, shifting some portion of the property tax
burden to their neighbors, the Commission recommends that
during the phase-in period all taxpayers required to pay at least
the same amount of property taxes they we a.ld have paid under the
acquisition method of assessment and one percent tax rate cap.
This phase-in approach eases the transition to market value assessment for homeowners while the tax revenue cap ensures that
tax rates will be lowered if housing price increases exceed the rate
of inflation. These safeguards afford homeowners greater protection than existed prior to 1978.
The Commission believes that local voters should have the right to
adjust local property tax rates and, therefore, adds to this recommendation a provision allowing changes in local tax rates by a
majority vote of the electorate. See recommendation number five.

Recommendation
TwoPreservation of
Homeownership

The Commission recommends, in the event the U.S. Supreme Court invalidates the assessment section of Article
XIIIA of the California Constitution, the Senate consider
legislation to exempt basic shelter from all property taxes,
and to:
a) Return to market value assessments immediately for all
new and current property taxpayers;
b) Increase the homeowners' property tax exemption to
$50,000 per home, index the exemption for inflation and
convert the exemption to a locally administered program;
c) Maintain revenue neutrality by lowering (in the first
and each subsequent year) the countywide tax rate (exclusive oflocal bond service) on a county-by-county basis
to a level which will generate an amount of revenue
equal to the prior year's revenue, adjusted annually for
growth in population and an appropriate inflation index;
d) Provide that local voters may change local tax rate caps
by a majority vote.

6
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To protect basic shelter from property taxation, the Commission
recommends that the current homeowners' property tax exemption be increased to $50,000 and, thereafter, be adjusted annually
based on an appropriate housing inflation index. Homeowners
would not be taxed on the first $50,000 (or the basic shelter
portion) of their homes; homes valued under $50,000 would be
property tax-free. The policy objective of this recommendation is
to establish a property tax haven for all homeowners for a necessity of life without regard to household income.
Because local government will no longer experience a loss of
revenue as a result of the homeowners' property tax exemption,
the need to continue this program as a state-administered and
state-reimbursed program is ended. Since the entire cost of the
homeowners' exemption will be paid for by the increased local
revenues derived from returning to market value assessments, the
state will be relieved of reimbursing local governments by $360
million in 1990-91.
The Commission does not believe that a return to market valuation must necessarily result in an overall increase in the property
tax burden. Therefore, it recommends that local government tax
rates be lowered by an amount approximately equal to the increased revenue derived from returning to market value assessments. A reasonable index to account for population changes and
inflation should be employed.
The Commission believes that local voters should have the right to
adjust local property tax rates and, therefore, adds to this recommendation a provision allowing changes in local tax rates by a
majority vote of the electorate. See recommendation number five.

Recommendation
Three·
Split Tax Rates

The Commission recommends, in the event the U.S. Supreme Court invalidates the assessment section of Article
XIIIA of the California Constitution, the Senate consider
legislation to set tax rates on homes lower than incomeproducing property, and to:
a) Return to market value assessments immediately
for all new and current property taxpayers;
b) Lower the property tax rate for homeowners by
an amount sufficient to make the homeowner portion of the tax roll revenue neutral for local government, and thereafter automatically lower the
tax rate each year by an amount equal to the
revenue generated by the increased valuation
7
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from owner-occupied residences allowing for new
home construction and an appropriate inflation
index;
c) Maintain for the business portion of the tax roll
(apartments, agriculture, cc,mmercial and industrial properties) the current one percent tax rate
cap;
d) Limit prospective voter-approved tax rate overrides to the homeowner portion of the tax roll.
The Commission recognizes and differentiates between two categories of property taxpayers: homeowners and the owners of
income-producing properties. And, the Commission notes the
importance homeownership plays in California society.
The Commission devoted extensive discussion to a variety of split
roll or split rate proposals. Proponents and opponents of the split
roll concept are found across the ideological spectrum. The Commission, like the testimony it heard, is more divided on this issue
than any other.
Under this recommendation, commercial and rental residential
property taxpayers will experience a $5.9 billion property tax
increase over current property tax obligations. These monies will
primarily benefit local government. The Commission judged this
amount reasonable in light of the current $14 billion fiscal shortfall; considering that the original intent of Proposition 13 was
aimed mainly at reducing homeowner property tax burdens;
recognizing that any Supreme Court action will cause this magnitude of property tax increase for business unless the Legislature
elects to simply return all new tax proceeds; and, noting that
business will still enjoy the one percent tax rate cap guaranteed in
the California Constitution.
A primary argument against a split tax rate system is the potential for future abuse. Critics worry that once a uniform tax roll is
breached, divisions in the tax roll will proliferate. Other states,
particularly Minnesota with numerous divisions ranging from five
percent to fifty-five percent of market value, are cited. The
Commission recognizes this danger, but, on balance, thinks the
need for additional local government revenues, the desirability of
maintaining low homeowner property taxes and the simplicity of
this particular split roll proposal outweigh this concern.

8

A major concern of the business community, which opposes any
split roll proposal, is the prospect that it will find itself politically
isolated in each community. The specific fear is that voters will
approve tax overrides more readily, kno~Ning that a preponderance of the tax increase will be paid by business. The Commission
addresses this concern by restricting future voter-approved overrides to the homeowner portion of the roll only. However, this solution, while protectingincome-producingproperty, leaves owneroccupied residential property vulnerable to tax increases enacted
by homeowner-voters and non-homeowner-voters alike.
The Commission also notes that business taxpayers will be able to
deduct any increased property tax payments from federal income
tax payments. Thus, business property taxpayers will not be hit
with the full impact of this tax increase and California will recapture some of the federal tax windfall which occurred in the wake
of Proposition 13.

GENERAL
RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are offered as specific reforms
which the Commission believes worthy of consideration regardless of Court action.
Recommendations four through eight
address specific problems which are a direct result ofArticle XIIIA
of the California Constitution and which would be automatically
resolved by a Court decision and a return to market valuation of
property, but that should be addressed by the Senate notwithstanding a Court decision. Finally, recommendation number nine
concerns the requirement for comprehensive tax data and information in the legislative process.

Recommendation
FourGenerational Equity

The Commission recommends that the constitutional provision exempting real property inherited by a child from
reappraisal to market value be abolished.

Article XIIIA (Section Two) ofthe California Constitution exempts
from reappraisal a property owner's home and up to $1 million of
other real property when that property is transferred to a child.
This exemption can be used repeatedly and indefinitely, forestalling a market reassessment forever.
The inequity is clear. One young family buys a new home and is
assessed at full market value. Another young family inherits its
home, but pays taxes based on their parents' date of acquisition
even though both homes are of identical value. Not only does this
constitutional provision offend a policy of equal tax treatment for
taxpayers in similar situations, it appears to favor the housing
needs ofchildren with homeowner-parents over children with non9
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homeowner-parents. With the repeal of the state's gift and
inheritance tax in 1982, the rationale for this exemption is negligible.
The Commission notes that
remarkable disparity of treatment perverts even the strongest argmnents in behalf of the
acquisition method of assessment and, understandably, was not
advanced in 1978 by the proponents of Proposition 13. A U.S.
Supreme Court decision invalidating the assessment section of
Article XIIIA, and a return to market valuation, would automatically correct this inequity.
Absent a Court decision, the Commission recommends that the
Constitution be amended to provide that all real property transferred to children be reappraised at the time of transfer.

Recommendation
FiveLocal Finance &
Local Control

The Commission recommends that the California
Constitution be amended to grant local voters in each
jurisdiction the right to modify local property tax rates by
a miQority vote.
The Commission heard local government officials present the case
for both more local dollars and greater local control over those
dollars. The Commission also heard testimony urging local expenditure reductions, that is to say, elimination or reduction of unnecessary or lower priority governmental expenses.
The Commission, representing a cross section of community perspectives and experiences, is persuaded that local government is
fiscally strained and that, as a result, governmental services in
California have suffered. More important than the Commission's
views is what a majority of local citizens think about the level of
service and spending by their local government. A democracy
vests in the people the right to upsize or downsize the government,
to evaluate governmental efficiency and priorities, and to elect
governmental policymakers. The people traditionally have exercised these rights by a majority vote.
The Commission is cognizant of the argument that vote thresholds
higher than the standard majority vote protect the people from excessive taxation. This may be so, but it is not the way business is
conducted in a free society. Majority rule is the established vote
requirement for electing leaders and governing the country. Twothirds vote requirements permit the minority to obstruct the will
of the majority.

10
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The level of taxation in California is roughly comparable to other
states. Expressed in terms of state and local taxes paid per $1,000
of personal income, California is slightly below the national
average ($112 per $1000 of personal income in California versus
$116 per $1000 nationally). 2 Under these circumstances, the Commission believes that it is reasonable and vvise to give local voters
the opportunity to set local levels of taxation if for no other reason
than different communities in a state the size of California will
most certainly have different, and changing, requirements for governmental service.
Constraints on the free exercise of the people's will frustrates the
democratic process. The current constitutional requirement prohibiting local voters from increasing local property tax rates for local purposes undercuts the ability oflocal citizens to monitor and
manage their local government.
The Commission notes that under the current acquisition propertytax assessment system voter overrides will widen side-by-side
disparities. Recent property buyers will undergo larger dollar tax
increases than longer term owners of similar property if voters
approve tax rate increases.

Recommendation
Six-

Valuation of
Corporate Property

The Commission recommends that property owned by cor- ,
porations and partnerships be treated the same as all other
property for purposes of property tax reassessment. To implement this recommendation, the "change of ownership"
statute requires review and modernization.
Article XIIIA of the California Constitution gives the Legislature
responsibility for defining "change of ownership" for property tax
assessment purposes, that is, determining the point at which a
property must be reassessed to full market value. The current
statutory definition of "change of ownership" treats homes and
corporate properties differently, and invites tax avoidance.
Under the current definition of" change of ownership", residences
are reassessed to market value upon sale. For properties owned
by tenants-in-common, each share of the property is reassessed to
market value when that share is sold.
By contrast, property owned by publicly traded corporations and
property owned by partnerships are not reappraised to market
value unless over fifty percent of the corporate shares or partnership is sold to one buyer. For instance, to use an extreme example,
if 100percent of a corporation's stock is sold, but no one person
11
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_u

purchases more
pretends that the .,...,..,,.....,..
sold.

company, California law
by the corporation has not been

Home-

Moreover,
ownership
market value.
and its ct::s:::~t:r::i!St:u
to market

Ho.,..or•'>lf'O hoi·urt:>on

to structure property
to full
a property'S true Value
to avoid reassessment

.,...,...,.,.....,,",......"'can sell its property
example, a real estate
can arrange to sell onetime, eventually selling
This arassessment secvaluation, would
U-"''"''-''" a Court decision, the
statutory definition of"change
amended provide
market value upon a subdefinition is inconsistent with
acquisition method of
assessment.
The Commission
future revenues accruing to local
"change of ownership" can
be used for either reducing property tax rates, augmenting local
government revenues or a combination of both. The Commission
recommends that the funds be used to increase governmental
resources since
the current statutory
definition causes the under taxation of some properties beyond the
constitutional expectation of Article XIIIA.

Recommendation
SevenState/Local Fiscal
Accountability

The Commission recommends that health and welfare programs for which a need for state intervention exists be
funded and administered as state programs. The Commission recommends the state begin by assuming responsibility for three specified
programs.

Property Tax Equity and Revenue

A sensible and cost-effective system for the provision of governmental services should divide responsibilities clearly among different agencies and various levels of government to promote
efficient management and accountable public policy. Citizen-taxpayers have a right to know that a particular governmental agency
or official can be held accountable for the delivery of services.
A persistent complaint from local government officials is the proliferation of unfunded state mandates imposed on local government. The too-often heard "my hands are tied, go to Sacramento"
from local officials is symptomatic of this problem. This refrain is
troubling because it illustrates the murky disquiet in which
citizens find themselves when sorting out precisely which services, what kind of decisions and whose tax dollars are locally
controlled.
Among the programs considered prime for state assumption are
judicial expenses, corrections, county health service, mental health
programs, AFDC, In-home Supportive Services, food stamps, and
General Assistance. Because these social services programs
should be the responsibility ofthe state's taxpayers and are expenditures driven by factors beyond the control oflocal decision makers, funding should not depend on local property tax wealth.
The Commission recommends that the state begin a process ofdisengaging health and welfare programs from the property tax. The
Commission identified three income distribution programs which
should be transferred immediately to the state, both fiscally and
administratively. The three programs are: Aid to Families and
Dependent Children (AFDC), food stamps and general assistance.
The increased state cost for these three programs would have been
$698 million in fiscal year 1990-91. This cost can be funded from
state savings resulting from shifting the homeowners' exemption
to local government, which will be $360 million plus repealing, in
whole or in part, selected state tax expenditures.
The Commission reviewed numerous state tax expenditures relating to property and housing. The Commission recommends that
the expenditures for these tax programs be evaluated against
other, possibly more pressing state program needs, including the
Commission's recommendation to "buy out" local health and
welfare programs. While state tax policy falls outside the Commission's purview, a partial listing of property and housing tax expenditures are identified as possible candidates:

13
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a) Capital Gains Exclusion for Inherited Property. Exempts permanently from capital gains taxation the appreciated
State cost: $240
in 1991-92.
JULLJUUVAA

on
a
for
over
Excludes $125,000 of home
value from capitali'O"''...."' taxation for taxpayers over 55
years of age. State
$150 million in 1991-92.
A:.IA\.<AUOAVAA

c) Deferral of Capital Gains on Sale ofPrincipal Residence.
capital gains taxes upon sale of
Taxpayers may
a home
a
of equal or greater value
within 2 years.
cost: $460 million in 1991-92.
d) Deduction for Mortgage
for Vacation and Second Homes.
are permitted to deduct from
state income taxes
mortgage interest for multiple
residences, including vacation homes. State cost: $65
million in 1991-92.
e)

Recommendation
EightLocal Government
Revenue
Apportionment

for Vacation and
are
to deduct from
state income taxes
paid property taxes for multiple
residences, including vacation homes. State cost: Unknown, but substantiaP

The Commission recommends
current statutory
allocation of property
revenues among local government jurisdictions (the
8 formula) be reviewed and amended
accommodate changing local
conditions. The Commission further recommends the
Special District
redesigned to af.
ford special districts a measure of independence from
county government.
Thirteen years ago, the
enacted on an emergency and
temporary basis a
ofproperty tax revenues to local governmental jurisdictions, a formula which was subsequently permanently fixed into law by Assembly Bill 8. Since
that time, AB 8 has remained essentially unchanged.
The AB 8 formula is based on the relative share of property tax
revenue each local governmental jurisdiction received in the three
years prior to Proposition 13. Whatever the wisdom of using this

14
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approach back in 1978, the formula and the data upon which it was
based are now obsolete.
The AB 8 formula inadequately accommodates changing local
needs, priorities and circumstances. While accounting for new
construction within jurisdictions, it fails account for population
shifts among localities, service and caseload increases and decreases (e.g., the number of school age children; the number of
individuals living at or below the poverty level, etc.) or other
conditions.
Under the AB 8 formula, some citizens are penalized in perpetuity because they reside in jurisdictions that maintained low levels
of property taxation in the pre-Proposition 13 period. The arbitrary use of a three year period to determine future property tax
allocations locks in for all time the combination of property tax
rates and assessed valuations extant in the years 1975-76 to 197778.
Some local government officials argue that basic local services are
so important to life and property that they deserve the same kind
of funding equalization governing local school districts. They note
that fundamental government services, such as police and fire
protection and emergency health care, are especially impaired
since the AB 8 formula ignores any per capita component so that
local government resources are frozen, unable to adjust to changing demographics.
The Commission observes that in the event the Supreme Court
does not invalidate the assessment section of Article XIIIA, then
local government finance is a zero-sum situation, i.e., to alter the
existing AB 8 formula requires shifting funds from one jurisdiction
to another, a Herculean political task when all local governments
are operating under tight budgets. In the event the Supreme
Court does strike down the assessment cap, the possibility of increased local revenues exists and, consequently, the opportunity
to create a fairer distribution of local property tax revenues
without harming the citizens of one area to help another.
In both instances, the Commission found no justification for continuing the current AB 8 formula. It serves neither local government nor its citizens well. A new formula is required which
provides a measure of flexibility and adaptability.

15
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Recommendation
NineAccurate Policy
Information

The Commission recommends that a property tax data
base, and accompanying analytic and modeling capability,
be developed for the Legislature and other governmental
agencies.
In the course of its deliberations, the Commission discovered significant gaps in the information available to the Legislature and
other policymakers concerning the property tax system. For instance, it is very difficult, and in some instances impossible, to
determine with accuracy and reliability the impact ofproposed tax
changes with respect to:
The outcome on property tax revenues statewide;
The outcome on property tax revenues by county;
The outcome on property tax revenues over time;
The outcome on property tax burdens by property type;
The outcome on property tax burdens by length of ownership;
f) The outcome on disparities in property tax burdens;
g) The outcome on property tax burdens over time.
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

Without this type of modeling capability it is nearly impossible to
predict the impact of property tax reforms presented to policymakers. Without reliable information, policymakers may advance options which are ill-considered.
The Commission believes that, even without the U.S. Supreme
Court proceeding on Article XIIIA, the property tax system will
come under increasing scrutiny in the years ahead. The fiscal
problems oflocal government will force this evaluation. To accomplish this task thoughtfully requires better information than is
currently available.
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CHAPTER II:
CALIFORNIA'S PROPERTY TAX SYSTEM
Taxes on property have a long history as sources of governmental
revenue. Property taxes were utilized in ancient Rome as well as
medieval England. Property taxes were widely levied in the
United States during the colonial period and throughout the late
18th and 19th centuries. 4 As recently as 1902, property taxes
accounted for more than half of total government revenues in the
United States.
With the growth offederal revenues in the first half of the twentieth century, the property tax declined as a major source of total
national government revenues. By the end of World War II,
property taxes had dropped to approximately 15 percent of total
governmental revenues in the United States, although still accounting for half oflocal receipts. As income and sales taxes became increasingly popular with state governments, the property
tax emerged as the primary source of local government revenue,
becoming primarily a local tax. 5
At various times throughout history, taxes have been imposed on
both tangible property, i.e., land, buildings and merchandise, and
intangible property, i.e., securities and other financial assets. In
more recent times, however, the trend has been toward limiting
taxation to tangible property in general and real property in particular. Taxes on personal property are still utilized in some states
although most, like California, exempt household goods from
taxation.6
The property tax was first imposed in California in 1850 as a state
and local tax by the newly convened California Legislature. Property taxes served as the major revenue source for state government until the tum ofthe century. In 1905 the electorate approved
the recommendations of a state Commission on Revenue and
Taxation to give local governments the exclusive right to levy
property taxes. 7 Despite periodic difficulties with assessment
practices over the years, reliance on property tax revenues continued and in 1977, the year before Proposition 13, the property tax
accounted for 40 percent oflocal revenues in the state.

17

Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue

Why a Taxon
Property?

The use of property wealth as a basis for taxation stems from the
general perception that it represents the best available measure of
a taxpayer's ability pay. This assumption was clearly valid in
times
were
paid in the form of lodging,
the value of total income could not
food or other commodities,
be measured
reasonable accuracy.
time this rationale
has been considerably
because only tangible property,
or more narrowly still, only real property is taxed. Nevertheless,
"ability to pay" continues as a prime argument in support of the
property tax when market value assessments are used to establish
property taxpayers' relative ability to pay.
Another supporting argument for property taxation rests on the
notion that the greater an individual's property holdings, the
greater his or her "stake" the community. Therefore, financial
support for governing the community should be paid in proportion
to the value one's property.
Perhaps the almost universal appeal of the property tax as a
revenue source lies in the comparative immobility ofproperty and,
therefore, ofthe tax base. From an administrative standpoint, real
property
easy to locate and stays put despite
differences
jurisdictions.
Another desirable attribute of the property tax is its relative
stability as a revenue source. This characteristic is attributable to
values are less subject to valuation
two factors. One, real
changes than the level of general economic activity. Two, in times
of economic fluctuations, especially downturns, periodic reassessments smooth out variations in the flow of revenues to government
treasuries. 8

Is the Property
Tax Fair?

The
applied to evaluate whether a tax is fair
are the extent which it conforms to either the "benefits principle" or the "ability to pay principle." Under the benefits principle, a tax is said to be fair if it is levied in proportion to the
benefits received from the government services financed from the
tax. The ability to pay principle holds that one's "fair share" of
taxes should be in proportion to ability to pay as measured by
income and/or wealth. 9
The benefit rationale as applied to property taxation is that public services increase the value of real property and, therefore,
should be paid for by the owners of property. A rigorous application of the rule would seem to limit the tax to the amount necessary
to pay for "property-related" services such as fire and police protec18

tion, and construction and maintenance of streets, sidewalks and
other infrastructure. Moreover, it does not necessarily follow that
the value of the services is in proportion to the value of the property.
as police and fire
Many important property-funded
protection (to name the most ob·vious) serve both property and
people. A broader, and more reasonable, interpretation holds that
all municipal services affect directly and indirectly the value of
property within a community. Simply put, the property tax is not
and cannot be treated as solely a property owners' user fee, paying
for services that seemingly benefit property directly.
Admittedly, the value of property is at best an imperfect indicator
of the property owner's ability to pay. First, the tax is normally
levied on the gross value of real and personal property without
regard to the owner's debt position and, hence, true net worth. Second, intangible property is generally excluded from the tax base so
that at best only a partial measure of wealth is obtained.
While the market valuation assessment methodology is not a
perfect system for determining taxpayer net worth, it is the best
technique known for levying a property tax that bears a relationship or connection to the taxpayer's ability to pay.

Pre-1978 Property
Tax Authority of
Local Government

During the first three-quarters of this century the property tax in
California was the fiscal mainstay oflocal government. It provided
fiscal independence and local control over public services at the
local level. Other revenue sources, such as sales or income taxes,
either were limited by state statute or were not available to local
governments.
By 1975 approximately 6,300 counties, cities, special districts and
school districts in California had authority to impose a tax 'on property within their jurisdictions. Overlapping boundaries meant
that a parcel could be taxed by the county and school district in
which it was located as well as the city and several special purpose
districts.
Tax levies and collections were administered by county governments for all jurisdictions within the county. Composite tax rates
were developed for each fiscal year by summing all applicable
rates. The distribution of tax collections was determined by the
amount levied on behalf of each jurisdiction.
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Growth in Property
Tax Exemptions

privately owned real and per"""".... .,....... portions ofthe tax rolls were
of property enjoyed full

religious, charitable,
personal effects.
• Business inventories, including livestock.
• Orchards and vineyards for the first three or four years
are '"'" ...~""'"""'·
Other classes of property
first
substantial
growing number
respondingly higher rates on
to taxation.

Pre-1978 Assessment
Practices

exemptions, such as the
a principal residence, and a
disabled veterans. The
tax base, requiring corproperty that remained subject

Property is taxed on
value as determined by elected
supervision of the State Board
county assessors, under the
ofEqualization.
the local administration of assessment practices over the
have resulted in legislation giving
the Board considerable authority to regulate assessment procedures and to make independent evaluations of assessed values.
For the most part, prior to
property was assessed at the
market value of the property as determined by sales transactions
of comparable property. In the absence of reliable market data, estimated replacement cost or,
the case of business property, a
value based on anticipated
income could be substituted.
The California Constitution
annual reassessment, but in
practice county assessors were not adequately staffed to conduct
a physical appraisal
each year.
Infrequent reassessments lagged behind the rapid increase in
property values during the seventies. As a result, increases in tax
bills following reassessments were sometimes substantial, precipitating complaints by property owners. These complaints
focused on the dollar increase in the tax levy over the prior year,
ignoring the fact that the owners has enjoyed several years of no
increases while the property rose in value.

Senate
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Tax Equity and Revenue

Pre-1978 Property , In fiscal1977 -78, prior to passage ofProposition 13, property taxes
in California yielded $11.5 billion for schools and local governTax Revenues & Exment. The statewide average composite rate was just over $10 per
penditures
$100 of assessed value or about 2.5 percent of market value. The
distribution of these revenues, together
a summary of other
local revenues, is shown in Table 1.

Table 1
Projected Distribution of Property Tax Revenues
1978-79(a)
Dollars in millions
Property Tax
Total
as Percent of
Average Tax Number of Property Tax
Rate (b)
Jurisdiction Revenues
Revenues Total Revenue
Cities(c)
Counties
Schools
Special Districts(d)

0.34%
0.73%
1.40%
0.17%

414
58
1,114
4,710

$1,645
3,504
6,468
831

$6,093
8,850
12,125
4,405

27%
40%
53%
19%

Totals

2.58%

6,296

$12,448

$31,473

40%

(a) As estimated by Legislative Analyst based on 1977-78 data and assuming pre-Proposition 13law.
(b) Expressed as percent of full market value
(c) Includes City and County of San Francisco
(d) Includes both Enterprise and Non-Enterprise districts.

Property taxes represent general purpose revenues, as opposed to
dedicated, or special purpose revenues, with the exception of
specific rates levied for purposes such as general obligation debt
retirement. City governments provide a wide array of municipal
services, while county governments serve as administrative agencies for state required programs, as well as being responsible for
basic municipal services to unincorporated areas. City and county
government expenditures by function for 1977-78 are shown in
Table 2.
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County Expenditures
of Total

Cities
14.50%

15.10o/o

Category of Expenditure
0 General Government

2.80%

00 Police and Fire

l:a Public Works

8.60%

ml Waste Disposal
!D Parks and Recreation

5.90o/o

e Libraries
39.40%

Other

13.70%

Counties
Category of Expenditure
D General Government
11!1 Police and Fire
tQ Public Works

21.90%

(]] Public Assistance

Bl Health and Sanitation

E3 Parks and Recreation

1m Libraries
II Other

13 Era. Assembly Office of Research, June 1981.
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Emergence of the
Property Tax Relief
Issue

In the decade prE~ce«tlln.e:
at a rapid rate. From
nue growth averaged
was attributable
to increasing tax
tax rates.

~-""'"'"''"""'~

Tax levies continued to
rapid rise in housing
median price of an existing
a
12
year period, rising from
to $62,430 in 1977. From
1973-74 to 1977-78, while tax
stayed flat, assessed values
percent in just
grew at a rate of12.5 percent per year ,jumping
the last year of this n ....... nr~
Relief from the perceived exc~esst
emerged as a major issue. The
measures was
1968
exemption
the first $3,000
market value
occupied home. This exemption was
market value,
mately $80 to
ers regardless of income.
Senior Citizens Property Tax Assistance. Provides
refunds of up to
of property taxes to
low Int:on:te nomteO'wners
Business Inventory Exemption. Exempted in 1986
fifty percent of the
value of business inventories. The exemption increased to one hundred percent in
1979.
Maximum Ta:x Rates. Placed caps on tax rates levied
by local government jurisdictions beginning in fiscal
year 1972-73.

Renters Ta:x Credit.
tax relief to renters in
the form of a refundable income tax credit, now worth
$60.
Senior Citizens Property Ta:x Postponement. Allows senior citizens
under $20,000 to
postpone all or part of the
on their homes until an
ownership change occurs.
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Williamson Land Act. Provides property tax reductions for landowners who agree to restrict their land to
agricultural use for a period of at least ten years.
Table 3 illustrates state payments for property tax relief programs
for the period 1968-69 through 1976-77, including both direct payments to taxpayers and subventions to local governments to compensate for lost revenues.

Table 3
State Property Tax Relief Payments
1968-69 Through 1977-78
(Dollars in millions)

$

~~~---------fto~••••~B~--i~n-es_s_an-:d~Agri~.c-w:t:~~~~1---.-------.--------.-------.-------.
Exemptions (b)
1200

+---------- 8 Renters Income Tax Credit

118 Senior Citizens Assistance
1000

+----------

[JJ Homeowners Property Tax

Exemption
800

Fiscal
Year

0

+----------

~~~wu~~~~~~uw~wy~~~~wu~~~~wu~uw~~wu~~~~wu~

1968-69

1969-70

1970.71

1971-72

1972-73

1973-74

Source: Legislative Analyst
(a) Includes Senior Citizens Homeowners Assistance and Postponement Programs
(b) Includes Busienss Inventory Reimbursements and Open Space Subventions
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1975-76

1976-77

Proposition 13What Does It Do?

The

•
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houses of the Legisla-

"special"
a local
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Immediate Impact of
Proposition 18 on
Taxpayers

The immediate effect on California taxpayers was a substantial
reduction in property tax bills. Reductions ranged from 70 percent
in Alameda County to 37 percent in Colusa County. For an
"average" California homeowner with a $50,000 home, the tax reduction amounted to approximately $750 per year.
The distribution of the tax reduction by class of property was estimated by the Legislative Analyst, as displayed in Table 4. The
table shows 45 percent of the tax savings accrued to non-residential property and only 37 percent of the tax savings accrued to
homeowners.

Table 4
Estimated Tax Reductions by Type of Property
1978-79
(Dollars in Millions)

$12,000

$10.000

C Pre-Prop 13 Levies
lEI Post-Prop 13 Levies

$6,000

ra Reduction
$4,000

$2,000

Owner
Occupied
Residential

Renter
Occupied
Residential

Commercial,
lnd1111trial &
Agricultural

Total

Percentage of Total Property Tax Reduction by Type of Property

36.60%

liJ Owner Occupied Residential
44.7~

mRenter Occupied Residential
El Commercial, Industrial It
Agricultural

Source: Legislative Analyst

1&7K
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"reverse ...o,ron uc;~ou.c::u.
$1.6 billion; or
tax cut was

The Homeowners' AJA'-'.U''~-''"'""-'homes
for no1meowne:rs
Legislative

Family
Income

Market
Value of
Home (a)

PreProp.

$ 5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
30,000
50,000
75,000

$30,000
34,000
37,500
42,500
54,000
72,000
80,000

$ 425
505

Tax

575
675

209

(340)

1,425

Source: Legislative Analyst
(a) Average market value for
at
assumed to be approximately 80%
(b) Based on estimated tax liabilities

two

-53.7%
-50.4%
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Immediate Impact of
Proposition 18 on
Local Government

Proposition 13 became effective on July 1, 1978, just three weeks
after its approval by voters. For the 1978-79 fiscal year, local governments faced revenue losses of approximately $7 billion, an
amount equal to 57 percent of property tax revenues and 22
percent oflocal revenue from all sources.
Proposition 13, however, did not specify how the revenues remaining after the tax rate and assessment roll-backs should be allocated, only that the apportionment would be "in accordance with
law." No law existed to specify the apportionment of property tax
revenues from a fixed tax rate among local jurisdictions.
The revenue loss threatened local jurisdictions unevenly because
of differing degrees ofreliance on the property tax. School districts,
for example, had received more than 50 percent of their total
revenues from the property tax in 1976-77, while counties relied on
the property tax for about 35 percent of total revenues. Cities were
less dependent, with the property tax accounting for about 15 percent of city revenues, and special districts varied from zero to 90
percent.

In the short time before the effective date, the Legislature adopted
a massive emergency fiscal assistance plan for local governments.
This "bail-out" legislation, as it was called, was possible because
the General Fund had accumulated a surplus during the previous
year that was projected to grow during 1978-79 and beyond.
Senate Bill 154 was enacted which:
• Provided for the allocation among local governments of
the property tax revenues collected under the one percent cap for fiscal 1978-79 on the basis of formulas tied
to the actual distribution of revenues in the preceding
three years;
• Shifted all or a part of various county health and welfare
programs to the state;
• Provided block grants to the cities, counties, school districts and special districts to partially replace the property tax revenue loss.
The following year Assembly Bill 8, referred to as the "long range
solution," adopted much of what had been enacted in SB 154 with
several modifications:
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Table 6
Summary of Property Tax Revenues and State Aid
Before and Mter Proposition 13
(Dollars in Millions)

(1)

1979-80
(2)

Percent
Change
(3)

Schools - K-12
Property Tax
$4,375
State Apportionments
2,323
State Assumption of Program Costs
Categorical Aid
707
Total
$7,405

$2,107
2,618
2,191
756
$7,672

$1,699
2,538
3,256
1,081
$8,574

15.8%

Community Colleges
Property Tax
$743
State Apportionments
473
State Assumption of Program Costs
Total
$1,216

$325
539
290
$1,154

$266
568
408
$1,242

2.1%

Counties
Property Tax
$3,154
State Assumption of Program Costs
Block Grant
Total
$3,154

$1,349
1,078
424
$2,851

$1,858
1,296

1977-78

Cities
Property Tax
Block Grants
Total
Special Districts
Property Tax
Block Grants
Total

1978-79

$,1073
$1,073
905
$ 905

Source: Governor's Budget Summary 1980-81
(1) Includes effect of Proposition 13 and SB 154

(2) Includes effect of AB 8
(3) Percent change from 1977-78 to 1979-80
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$3,154

$448
221
$669

$725

362
190
$ 552

618

$725

0.0%

-32.4%

---$ 618

-31.7%

.

In addition

crease
of, not one "'"''..it>"''""
percent of
changed

The annual

a consensus
that 40 percent
taxed under
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Table 7
Property Taxes for a Median Priced Home
by Year of Purchase

1989

Year Acquired
Pre 1976
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

Value in
Year of
Purchase

1989
Assessed
Value

Property
Tax

$41,690
48,740
62,430
71,040
84,330
99,760
107,940
112,040
114,620
114,510
120,120
133,930
142,370
168,560
196,521

$55,009
63,050
79,176
88,329
102,798
119,222
126,469
128,699
129,081
126,428
130,022
142,128
148,122
171,931
196,521

$ 514
600
772
870
1,025
1,201
1,278
1,302
1,306
1,278
1,316
1,446
1,510
1,765
2,028

Annual
Savings
$1,514
1,428
1,256
1,158
1,003
827
750
726
722
750
712
582
518
263
-0-

Source: Adapted from Phillips, Robyn, Bestorinl!' Property Tax; Equjty

Uneven Distribution
ofBenefits

The most controversial aspect of Article XIIIA is the manner in
which the benefits from the two percent annual reassessment cap
are distributed. As noted earlier, these benefits continue to accrue
only so long as ownership does not change, thereby permitting
property owners to avoid reappraisal to market value.
Aptly, the reassessment portion of Article XIIIA has been called
the "welcome stranger" provision. The newcomer to an established community is welcome because she will be contributing a
larger percentage of support to local government than her wellsettled neighbors who own comparable homes.
Because increases in market values have exceeded the two percent
annual cap, owners of property purchased in 1975 today pay far
less taxes than a recent home buyer for comparable property.
Moreover, parcels with vastly different market values can be
found which pay the same property taxes. The amount of tax a
property owner pays has more to do with when the property was
purchased than with current market value of that property.
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In Corte Madera, a 1,584 square foot tract home sold
in August 1989 for $369,000, which established its
new assessment valuation for the 1990-91 tax year. A
nearly identical home next door is assessed at $120,000
and throughout the surrounding neighborhood comparable homes are assessed at $60,000 to $70,000.
In San Mateo, a 1971 home near the Hillsdale Shopping Center sold in July 1988for$401,000;theowners
are currently paying about $4,100 in property taxes.
Next door, a slightly bigger house built in 1969 is assessed at $84,934, giving its owners a tax bill of$875.

Acquisition
Valuation: Pro &
Con

Advocates of the acquisition assessment system justifiably argue
that all taxpayers are treated equally when they purchase property, and point to the predictability and certainty of future property tax payments from the assessment ceiling. They further note
that the acquisition valuation system avoids taxing unrealized
paper gains.
Critics of the acquisition assessment system contend that certainty and predictability alone are not overriding criteria for
evaluating a tax system. A reassessment law that automatically
increased property taxes by 50 percent per year would be certain
and predictable, but also confiscatory and unreasonable.
Critics further note the negative consequence of creating permanent classes of taxpayers. A new class is created for all property
owners purchasing property on a given day, and that class will
forever enjoy lower property taxes relative to all classes of taxpayers established thereafter so long as property values exceed the
two percent annual reassessment cap.
The reassessment provision of Article XIIIA offers a Mephistophelian solution: the taxpayer is granted his wish for a predictable,
moderate property tax for himself, but tax equity for his neighbors
is forsaken. The ideal, of course, is for a property tax system to be
both fair and predictable.

Amendments to
Article XIIIA

Because the benefits of the annual reappraisal cap are substantial, a change of ownership, triggering a reassessment to current
market value, can produce a sizeable increase in property taxes. A
number of exemptions have been enacted through ballot propositions to prevent reassessment in specific instances. In 1986 the
following ballot propositions were approved by the voters:
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Court Challenges to
the Acquisition
System

Immediately
in the
Proposition 13
States
the
pealed. By a
dismissed the
In 1989

ruled in a West
to those prescribed
provisions. In
case, Allegheny Pittsburg Coal Co. v. County CQmmission ofWebster County,
County followed a
practice of reassessing
was sold, but did little
bring other properties into
increasing market values.
This practice, not sanctioned by any
law or policy, resulted
in wide property
Following this Supreme Court
three cases were filed
California courts challenging the assessment system contained in
Article XIIIA of the California Constitution. These cases, two of
which are currently being
to the U.S.
allege that the "welcome
of assessing a
purchased property at its
price, while a comparable
property next
value, denies taxpayers
equal protection as
Constitution. 17
Two of these cases, Stephanie Nordlingerv. JohnJ. Lynch and the
County of Los Angeles and Northwest Financial y. State Board of
Equalization and San Diego County, argue that recently pur-
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chased single family homes are assessed at higher values than
nearby comparable properties. In Nordlinger, for example, the
plaintiff argues that her residence, purchased in March, 1989 is
taxed at $1,700 while her next door neighbor, with a larger house
on a larger lot, has a tax bill of $368. The third case, R. H. Macy
& Co. y Contra Costa County, makes a similar argument regarding business property.
Both the Nordlinger and Macy cases cite evidence of widespread
assessment disparities. Studies submitted by the plaintiff in
N ordlinger compared assessments of properties purchased in
1989 to assessments of properties purchased before 1975 in 46
neighborhoods in Los Angeles County. The data indicate that
ratios of assessments of 1989 purchased properties to 1975 purchased properties ranged from 9 to 1 in Lincoln Park and 17 to 1
in Santa Monica's Ocean Park.

In the Macy case, the plaintiff and the county jointly conducted a
study of residential and business properties that had changed
ownership in 1987. Those properties that had not previously
changed ownership since 1975 were identified and the 1987
assessed value under the two percent cap was compared to the
1987 market value. This study revealed that the average market
value of properties assessed on the basis of 1975 values was 3.2
times the assessed value .
.Impact on Business
Property Taxpayers

While most business leaders opposed the Jarvis-Gann initiative,
the impact of Proposition 13 has been quite favorable for business
property taxpayers. Forty-five percent of the immediate property
tax cut resulting from Proposition 13, or $2.9 billion, accrued to
owners of agricultural, business, commercial and industrial property. If income-producing residential property (apartments and
other renter-occupied properties) is considered business property,
then sixty-three percent, or $4 billion in tax savings accrued to
business property taxpayers. See Table 4.
Contrary to some predictions, the property tax burden has not
shifted from commercial and industrial property to residential
property since 1978. It was widely thought that residential properties changed ownership more frequently than business property
and, therefore, would experience a higher assessment ratio over
time, and a correspondingly greater share of the tax burden.
Current data do not support this hypothesis.
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Inasmuch as Article XIIIA does not distinguish between classes of
property, taxpayers owning all types of property are treated alike

for both tax rate and tax assessment purposes. Consequently, the
same side-by-side equity and tax: burden distributional issues
affecting homeowners also touch busines;;: property owners.
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CHAPTER IV:
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND
PROPERTY TAX REVENUE
Following passage of Proposition 13, local government struggled
to provide basic public services with significantly fewer resources.
During the 1981-1982 recession state revenues fell below the
levels specified by the "deflator" provision of AB 8. In two
successive fiscal years the Legislature suspended implementation
of the deflator clause but enacted selective reductions in state aid
which exacerbated the fiscal problems oflocal governments. Efforts were made to alleviate the revenue shortages by enhancing
local government's ability to levy various fees and user charges.
In 1984 the Senate Office of Research published a study which
detailed the Legislature's actions in the area of local finance
during the five years following Proposition 13, and also reported
the fiscal condition of cities, counties and local governments at
that time. 17 The findings concluded that:
·
• County general purpose revenue, after adjusting for inflation, declined 16 percent between 1977-78 and 198384.
• County expenditures (inflation adjusted) on all local
services except public protection and debt service declined during this period.
• City general purpose revenues (inflation adjusted) fell
by 9 percent during the same five years.
• Revenues to non-enterprise special districts dropped by
6 percent.
Later that year, the Legislature adopted the"Long-TermLocal Financing Act of 1984" intended to meet local government needs on
a permanent basis. The measure increased local government's
permanent share of the Vehicle License Fee but eliminated the
inventory tax subventions. The net effect was only a marginal improvement in the local fiscal situation. Since 1984 the revenue
pinch on local government has tightened, despite continued state
efforts to alleviate the problem.
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In addition to the revenue loss, Proposition 13 profoundly altered
the relationship between state and local government, shifting to
the state most decision-making authority concerning the amount
and distribution oflocal revenues. Even prior to Proposition 13,
the state had preempted the income tax and controlled the rate of
local sales taxes. With a maximum property tax rate imbedded in
the state constitution and the distribution of the revenues governed by state law, local governments and school districts lost
their last major source of fiscal independence. Power shifted to the
state.

Local Government
Finance

To speak of government finance in California today is to become
embroiled in a discussion about the appropriate size, scope and
nature of government's mission. Everyone, it seems, wants to "cut
the fat in government" and then keep it on a strict diet. But one
taxpayer's useless program may well prove another's essential
sel'Vlce.
Moreover, the Commission is aware ofthe invisible nature ofmany
vital governmental services. Water quality control or mosquito
abatement, for example, are preventive actions, noticed by the
general public only in their absence. Assigning specific value or
priority ranking to each governmental program in these instances
is difficult which is why governmental budgeting is a process of
comprormse.
Finally, the Commission notes that oftentimes the decision to
provide a particular governmental service is less a choice about if
and more a determination about when. Some services are a
question of paying now, or paying later. In this category, mental
health care for homeless persons is a good example. Care can be
provided early on by mental health workers or later by police officers who, responding to citizen complaints, take a disturbed
homeless person into custody. The outcome, of course, is the poor
utilization of limited police manpower, crowded jails, clogged
courts and, ultimately, the involvement of the mental health
system anyway.
The Commission did not undertake an independent, analytical
survey about the fiscal health oflocal government. However, it did
hear testimony on this issue. This testimony, coupled with the
informed judgment of individual Commissioners, gave the Commission reason to conclude that California local government is
attempting to meet an ambitious governmental service agenda
with inadequate means.
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The Counties

The revenue crunch has been felt most keenly by county governments because of the burden of administering state mandated
health, welfare, and criminal justice programs. In the "1990-91
Budget: Perspectives and Issues," the Legislative Analyst18 presented an evaluation of the fiscal capacity of counties as measured
by the level and change in "local purpose revenues" from 1984-85
through 1987-88. These revenues are defined as the excess of
general purpose revenues, i.e. property tax, sales tax and nondedicated state subventions, over expenditures on state required
programs. The study found that, after adjusting for population
growth and inflation, local purpose revenues declined 6.5 percent
during the four-year period. In 1984-85 counties used approXimately 50 percent ofgeneral purpose revenues to support state required programs. By 1987-88 this share had risen to 55 percent.
During that period, the costs of state required programs increased
40 percent, while general purpose revenues grew 25 percent.
Table 9 sets forth the amounts of general purpose revenues and
state required programs for these two years.

Table 9
County General Purpose Revenues and Local Expenditures
for State Required Programs
(Dollars in Millions)

1984-85

1987-88

Percent
Change

$5,250

$6,582

25.4%

1,097
790
186
59
265
6
93
124

1,495
1,140
284
91
321
18
111
200

36.3%
44.3%
52.3%
53.7%
21.0%
178.0%
19.9%
60.8%

Total Expenditures

$2,620

$3,660

39.6%

Residual General Purpose Revenues

$2,630

$2,922

11.2%

General Purpose Revenues
State Required Program Expenditures
Judicial
Corrections
County Health Services
Mental Health
AFDC
IHSS
Food Stamps
General Assistance

Source: Legislative Analyst, as reported in Countjes on the Fiscal Fault Ljne
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The Legislative Analyst's study also pointed out considerable variation in fiscal capacity among counties. In 1987-88 the average
county had per capita local purpose revenues of$108. Individual
counties, however, received from $57 per capita in Solano County
to $599 in Sierra County. An extreme case was Alpine County with
a small population and a relatively large share of the property tax.
Several counties experienced sharp declines in local purpose
revenues during the period, with fourteen counties losing more
than ten percent. Ten counties had both below average and declining per capita local purpose revenues. The result of diminishing
revenues for non-state required programs is reductions in local
programs such as public safety, parks and recreation, and public
works.
A recent study by the California Counties Foundation19 discusses
some of the problems attendant to state required programs. As
seen in Table 7, the two largest expenditure areas in this category
are judicial and corrections. The study notes that more than 1000
changes were made by the Legislature in misdemeanor and felony
statutes between 1984 and 1989. These changes established new
crimes, extended sentences for existing crimes, and made incarceration mandatory for an increased number of crimes. These
changes clogged court calendars, increased prosecution and defense costs, and dramatically increased the need for county jail and
prison cells.
A second program area which has contributed to counties' fiscal
distress is health care. The Foundation study characterizes the
public health care system in California as an example of a dysfunctional state/county relationship. The study notes that in 1982 the
state transferred responsibility for the medically indigent adult
population to the counties with an allocation of funds equal to only
70 percent ofwhat the state had expected to spend for this program
under Medi-Cal. Further cuts in state support for the program
were made in the 1990-91 state budget.
A number of counties have recently been reported on the verge of
bankruptcy; in 1990 Butte County threatened bankruptcy proceedings. This action was forestalled by last minute action by the
Legislature which, according to county officials, averted the
immediate crisis but did not solve the long-term problem. The
Foundation report concludes that a general county fiscal collapse
is inevitable unless fundamental structural changes are made in
the programs and responsibilities performed by counties and the
revenues available to finance them.
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The Cities

Although cities have generally suffered less severe fiscal distress,
they are not without problems. In general, the revenue raising
authority of both charter and general law cities is considerably
broader than either counties or special districts. This authority,
together with the ability to increase
for services delivered
extensively utilized by
by municipal enterprise activities, has
cities to maintain fiscal stability.
A 1988 study20 compared total per capita city revenues, adjusted
for inflation and including enterprise activities, for 1977-78 and
1984-85. This comparison showed that revenues had increased by
9.7 percent during the period. Without enterprise activity revenues, a decline of16.1 percent was reported. This comparison also
showed that both federal and state aid had dropped significantly
during the period.
A more recent report, commissioned by the League of California
Cities21 , showed similar results with respect to general or nonenterprise revenues. According to this report, inflation adjusted
per-capita general revenues in 1987-88 were down by 17.5 percent
from 1977-78, indicating a slight further deterioration since 198485.

A major contributor to the revenue decline has been a steady drop
in federal aid. In the sixties and early seventies federal programs
for cities were a major revenue source. Many of these programs
were curtailed or discontinued after 1970. Total revenue from this
source, adjusted for inflation, declined from $2.1 billion in 1977-78
to $600 million in 1987-88.
In addition to substantial increases in enterprise activity charges,
cities have increased fees for non-enterprise activities, utility
users taxes, and the transient occupancy tax. Growth in these
taxes has been somewhat slowed by Proposition 62, approved in
1986, which requires general law cities to obtain voter approval for
increases in these levies.
The League report concludes that the revenue base of California
cities has not kept pace with population growth and inflation and
cities currently have significantly less ability to support services
to their population than they did eleven years ago.

The Schools

The financing of elementary and secondary education in California has a long, complex and controversial history. Two decades
ago, local revenue sources, primarily the property tax, provided
over sixty percent of the funding for K-12 operations. School dis43
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trict budgets were set by locally elected boards and after considering the amount of state aid available, property tax rates were set
at a level required to produce the revenue necessary to fund the
budget. The amount spent per pupil varied widely with the
assessed property value in the district and the commitment oflocal residents.
In 1971 the California Supreme Court held in Serrano y. Priest
that because local property wealth, i.e., the property tax base, was
a major determinant in the level of spending, the local school financing system was unconstitutional since a child's educational
opportunity was predicated on the happenstance ofwhether his or
her school district was property rich or property poor.
The Serrano decision touched off a debate in the education community and the State Legislature on how best to equalize spending to
assure that equal general purpose dollars were available to each
school district for each California school child. In 1976 a second
ruling by the Supreme Court reaffirmed the 1971 decision, but it
was not until passage of Assembly Bill65 in 1977 that a definitive
plan was put in place to implement the Court's mandate. Prior to
AB 65, Senate Bill 90 of 1972 was the first major legislative
attempt to address the Serrano decision. This measure provided
a guaranteed level of state funding per pupil, included additional
funds for school equalization to be phased in over five years, and
imposed for the first time revenue limits on each local school
district. These revenue limits, which became effective for fiscal
year 1973-74, effectively limited school budgets so that high
wealth school districts, i.e., districts with high property values, did
not have unrestricted dollar resources and, conversely, low wealth
school districts, i.e., ones with low property values, received a state
subsidy. In effect, school district general purpose budgets were
equalized.
Proposition 13 in 1978 negated AB 65 and created another upheaval in the structure of education funding. As noted earlier,
schools, along with local governments, were given a formuladetermined share of the property tax revenue raised by the one
percent tax rate. The allocation to local school districts was
reduced in 1979 to allow for shifting additional tax revenues to the
cities, counties, and special districts. The loss of school property
tax revenue was made up by increased state aid, and the overall
level of funding for individual school districts was reduced five to
fifteen percent for the fiscal year 1978-79, depending upon whether
the district was below or above the average spending level per
pupil.
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In 1988 California voters approved Proposition 98, designed to
guarantee a minimum level of funding for schools and community
colleges. This measure specified that total state General Fund
support for schools could not be less than
larger ofa) an amount
equal to the percentage of General
revenue allocated to
Kindergarten-14 education in 1986-87,
b) the same amount
received in the prior year, adjusted for inflation and enrollment.

Proposition 98 also required a portion of any state excess revenues,
i.e., revenues in excess of the Article XIIIB constitutional spending limit, be distributed to schools and community colleges rather
than returned to taxpayers. The excess revenues are limited to
four percent of the minimum school funding level. The minimum
funding level requirement may be suspended for one year by a twothirds vote of the legislature. The excess formula was modified by
Proposition 111 in 1990 which further complicated the state's
school finance system.
The net political and fiscal outcome of the legislation implementing the Serrano decision and Proposition 13 has been to substantially transfer decision-making authority for the financing of
schools from local boards to the state. Although property taxes
still account for about thirty percent of total local funding for
schools, school districts have no control over the amount of tax
revenue schools receive. Spending levels per pupil are established
by state law with the state providing the aid necessary to make up
the difference between these levels and property tax receipts.
One argument on behalf of maintaining a local school property tax
advances the notion that the local property tax enhances local control. However, local policy and decision-makingis no longer linked
to the local property tax because, as noted above, the Serrano
decision and the state constitution establishes local school budgets.
As local property wealth, i.e., assessed valuation, in a school
district increases, state aid is reduced (i.e., if assessed valuation
increases faster than the revenue guarantee created by Proposition 98), transforming school districts into de facto property tax
collection agencies for the state. In effect, property tax revenues
are funneled to the state.
The estimated composition ofK-12 funding in 1990-91 is shown in
Table 10. As shown in this table, state support now accounts for
more than 60 percent of the total.
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Table 10
Total Revenue for K-12 Education
1990-91
(Dollars in Millions)

Percent of Total

Source of Funds

Amount

State General Fund Apportiornnents
State General Fund Categorical Aids
State Lottery Fund
Other State Aid
Federal Funds
Local Property Taxes
Local Debt Service Taxes
Other Local Revenues

$10,696
4,331
614
519
1,789
5,014
305
2,025

42.3%

Total

$25,293

lOO.OOAl

17.1%
2.4%
2.1%
7.1%
19.8%
1.2%
8.00;0

Source: Governor's Budget, 1991-92

Of the $15.5 billion in state General Fund aid, $4.3 billion or 28
percent, represents categorical aid. These funds are earmarked
for specific education programs and may not be used for other
purposes. Categorical aid includes funding for a wide variety of
programs such as special education for handicapped children and
educationally disadvantaged youth.
Local revenues other than the property tax come from a variety of
sources, most of which are limited to specific purposes. Some of the
ways which schools have generated additional special purpose
revenues are: 22

Developer Fees. Fees on new construction are collected
from real estate developers to help pay for school construction. These fees are exacted by cities or counties on behalf
of school districts, and may range from a few hundred to
several thousand dollars per house. This revenue source is
not available in already settled areas which, nevertheless,
require school building maintenance, reconstruction or expansion.
Special Taxes. A few districts with affluent citizens have
succeeded in getting "special taxes" approved by the necessary two-thirds majority of voters in the district. Because
any increase in the one percent tax rate is prohibited under
Article XIIIA, these levies take the form of flat annual
amounts per parcel, rather than levies calculated on the
basis of the assessed value of the property.
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Local Fund Raising. Some school districts, again with
more affluent citizens, have been successful in private fund
raising efforts for the
of
or
cial school projects and
an ongoing source of
revenue for most districts,
charitable contributions have not proven
Overall expenditures per pupil, adjusted for inflation, amounted
to $3,54 7 in 1977-78 for K-12 schools in California. This figure
dropped to $3,409 the year following Proposition 13 and hit a low
of $3,258 in 1982-83. Since that year has risen fairly steadily,
reaching a peak of$4,263 in 1988-89. In the current year (199091) it is estimated to drop to $4,168. For 1991-92 the Governor is
proposing to suspend Proposition 98
guarantees and
budgeting for a spending level of$4,07 6 per student for the coming
school year. 23
California schools face major, and widely recognized, problems.
Among its dubious honors, California attempts to educate its
children in the nation's largest class sizes. As the doorway to
Southeast Asia and much of South America, California schools
bear the responsibility for educating the children of this era's
migration to the United States. Enrichment programs are curtailed or non-existent in many school districts and physical plant
maintenance is deferred beyond reasonably prudent standards.

The Infrastructure
Problem

A problem permeating all levels of government in California is the
deterioration and inadequacy of the infrastructure. Although this
condition is not easily quantified, there is evidence that the state
is falling behind in maintaining existing transportation, sewage
treatment and waste disposal facilities, and in constructing new
facilities to meet the demands of a growing population. Traffic
studies show congestion in urban areas is increasing at rates exceeding the population growth as a result of inadequate streets,
highways and mass transit systems. The Environmental Protection Agency has identified California as one of the states in
greatest need of sewage treatment facilities. The California Waste
Management Board has projected that several counties, including
Los Angeles County, will exhaust all existing and planned landfill
capacity within the next decade. The enormity of California's infrastructure needs is virtually unchallenged by informed commentators.24
Between 1978 and 1986 local governments were prohibited from
raising property taxes to service General Obligation bonds issued
to finance facilities. This prohibition brought local government
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The fiscal constraints
have become an effective political tool for no-growth and slow-growth advocates. Communities understandably are reluctant
allow development which
adds to the infrastructure and ecological burdens of an area (increased traffic, for
more potholes and more air
pollution) if the short-term
long-term carrying costs associated with the development are
paid for.

One unfortunate result is leapfrog development. Where
veloper fees, high land costs and community opposition combine to
thwart new housing,
people will live where housing
impact is urban sprawl, longer
more air pollution,
abandonment of the city center

Inequities of the
Allocation System

As noted earlier, Article XIIIA required the Legislature to create
a system for allocating the revenues generated by the one percent
tax rate to the various jurisdictions within each county. AB 8
required that property tax revenues generated in 1978-79 be
allocated to jurisdictions within a county on the basis of historical
pro rata shares during the preceding three years. These shares
were adjusted for the shift of property tax revenues from schools
contained in AB 8. Revenues
to local governments which was
generated by increases in assessed values subsequent to 1978-79
were assigned only to those jurisdictions in which assessed value
growth took place, again on the basis of historical shares.
Although some modifications have been made to the formulas in
the intervening years, the basic system remains in place. The
formula locked in, for alljurisdictions and for all time, the property
tax revenue distribution pattern in existence during the three
years prior to Proposition 13. No flexibility exists in the formula
to recognize the changing responsibilities oflocal governments or
the needs of residents.
Jurisdictions which believed they had been fiscally prudent in not
levying property taxes or by maintaining low tax rates in the pre1978 period protest that they are being penalized. One anomaly
to appear was 30 cities that had never levied a property tax and
were thus forever foreclosed from receiving any property tax
revenues. This situation persisted until1988 when counties were
required to transfer a share of their property tax revenues to cities with no or very low revenues. Taxpayers soon realized that all
property owners pay the same basic property tax rate regardless
of where in the state they live and what local government services
they receive.
Under current law, county supervisors enjoy virtually unlimited
discretion over the allocation of Special District Augmentation
Funds to special districts within the county. Counties have the
authority to shift funds among special districts, effectively setting
policy priorities among special districts and, in tight fiscal circumstances, favoring county dependent districts to alleviate county
fiscal problems.
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Funding New
Governmental
Jurisdictions

In the years following 1979 an elaborate procedure was put in
place to resolve the problem new or expanding jurisdictions.
Under the pre-1978 system, a new
would simply add its
rate to the rates being levied by
Because
Proposition 13limited the total rate
was required to share the one
revenues with the new
Under the system devised for this purpose, an area proposing incorporation must apply to the
Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO) in the county obtain an allocation of tax revenue
as well as approval for incorporation.
procedures require
LAFCO to determine the services to be shifted to the new city from
the county or special district, and the cost of those services. The
revenue to be allocated to the new city is based on this determination. In the case of annexations by existing cities, negotiations
must be successfully completed
the city and county regarding any adjustment in the revenue sharing formula as it
applies to the area to be annexed. 27 These procedures and negotiations invite controversy.
In addition to the problems involving newly created jurisdictions
and changing boundaries,
and inequities
development.
developed as a
which are relatively stable, and which growth in assessed value
has been slow, suffer fiscal distress to a greater degree than more
rapidly growing areas. The slow growth areas may be characterized both by the absence ofnew construction and by a relatively low
turnover
of ownership of existing properties. The assessed
value growth in these communities, therefore, is derived primarily
from the annual two percent assessed value increases.
A further complicating factor in the allocation system is the
growing use of redevelopment agencies. These agencies, which
can be formed by a city, are created for the purpose of promoting
development in "blighted" areas by purchasing and making land
available to private developers for commercial, industrial, or residential construction. The agency is entitled to receive all the
revenue generated by the increase in assessed value within its
boundaries. This arrangement siphons off revenues which otherwise would accrue to the city, county or special districts whose
boundaries overlap those of the redevelopment agency. Proponents argue that without redevelopment agency fiscal support the
new development, and thus the increase in assessed valuation,
would not occur.
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Court Challenges
to the Allocation
System

Two challenges to the AB 8 allocation system are currently
pending in the courts. These cases28 are as follows:
County of San Diego y, Controller of the State of California.
In this action, San Diego County
that AB 8 requires
an unfairly large proportion of
tax collections in
San Diego County be allocated to schools. According to the
county, this allows the state to provide a relatively smaller
subsidy to San Diego County Schools than it provides in
other counties while denying the county government revenues to which it is entitled.
City ofRancho Mirage v. County of Riverside. The city of
Rancho Mirage is a no-property-tax city. In this lawsuit, the
city argues that because the AB 8 allocation formula is
based on the amount of property taxes levied by a local
agency prior to Proposition 13, no-property-tax cities like
Rancho Mirage are unfairly penalized by being denied any
allocation of the tax, even though their citizens pay the
same tax rate as citizens living elsewhere in the county.
A third case, City of Rancho Cucamonga. et a1. y Counties of San
Bernardino and Los Angeles, was the subject of a recent State Supreme Court ruling. This suit was filed by a group of cities against
the Counties of San Bernardino and Los Angeles and the cities of
Redlands and Los Angeles. The plaintiff cities, which are either
no-property-tax or low-property-tax cities, argue that the AB 8
systemunfairlyshiftspropertytaxesawayfromhistorically"frugal"
cities and benefits historically "spendthrift" cities within any
given county. This is detrimental to taxpayers because their tax
dollars are exported to finance services to citizens of other communities. The Court ruled against the plaintiffs.
The central theme of the arguments in these cases is the inequity
created because all residents of the state pay the same basic one
percent tax rate but receive different levels of services as a result
of the unequal allocation of revenues. The intractable aspect of
this dilemma is the "zero-sum" requirement imposed by the one
percent tax rate limitation, to wit, any increase in the allocation to
one jurisdiction must be offset by a reduction to another.
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CHAPTERV:
STATEMENTS BY COMMISSIONERS

The breadth and diversity of experience of the Commission's
eighteen members inevitably generated a range of perspectives
about the issues at hand and the specific recommendations advocated by the Commission. To facilitate the fullest airing of these
viewpoints, this chapter contains individual statements by Commissioners.
Some statements disagree with one or more Commission recommendations. Some statements agree with particular recommendations, but for reasons different than the report states. All the
statements bear careful reading for, considered together, they are
a portrait of the Commission's discussion about property tax
equity and revenue.

Michael Kahn
Irene Angelo
Gerald Cochran
Melvin Gagerman
Robyn Phillips
Jack Theimer
lola Williams

Proposition 13 was a revolt by the taxpayers against the frightening uncertainty of perpetually rising property taxes. Proposition
13's legacy of predictable and manageable taxation can and should
be preserved. But Proposition 13's two other legacies - unconscionable tax disparity between people in identical situations;
and, starvation of the educational, health and welfare services of
our state threaten our democratic fonn of government and the humanitarian ideals of our society. There is simply no legitimate
excuse for discriminating against the young, the mobile and the
poor through a property tax system that allows many affluent
property owners in our state to perpetuate their incredibly low
taxes while the poorest and youngest bear the greatest proportion
of the tax burden. The testimony before the Commission and the
shared experiences of the Commissioners echoed the cries of
frustration and consternation dominating our newspapers, television and radio and news reports over the shocking conditions of
California's schools and critical social services caused by underfunding.
Because of these dual legacies as discussed in the reasoning of the
Report, we endorse enthusiastically the Commission's Report.
But, we do not agree that Californians or their elected representatives are paralyzed from dealing with the undemocratic and
harmful legacies of Proposition 13 until the courts inevitably rule
that Proposition 13 violates our fundamental laws. We believe
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California has a unique confluence oftwo circumstances: an unfair
property tax system which dramatically undertaxes our most
prosperous citizens and a fiscal crisis of historic magnitude. Accordingly, we believe the recommendations of the Commission
should be enacted by the Legislature and the people as soon as possible. Such enactments should be designed to equalize the tax
burden on all property owners in a fashion that produces sufficient
revenue to properly sustain the schools and public services which
Californians deserve.
We disagree with a fundamental recommendation of the Commission: enactment of a "split roll" for property taxes in California.

Kirk West
David Anderson
Sen. Marian Bergeson
Marla Marshall
Robyn Phillips

Under the proposed plan, all business property would be brought
up to current market value and then reassessed annually. These
taxpayers would experience an immediate $5.9 billion tax increase
and would face increases annually.
Under current law, thousands of corporations and proprietorships
have been reassessed due to sales, mergers, changes of ownership
and new construction. In fact, businesses currently pay 67 percent
of the property taxes in California, up from 63 percent when Prop.
13 was passed in 1978. If this proposal were adopted, business
would pay about 80percent of the property tax.
We believe this program would be very damaging to California's
economy which must create 250,000 jobs each year to keep unemployment from rising. In recent months, there has been extensive
negative publicity about California's business climate and the
potential erosion of our employment base.
A recent survey by the California Business Roundtable of 836
California firms revealed that 41percent of the companies have
plans to expand outside of California and 14percent of all companies (24 percent of manufacturers) have plans to relocate outside
California.
The Grant Thorton Company ranking of California's manufacturing climate in 1989 was a dismal22nd out ofthe 29 states with high
manufacturing intensity. Results from these and other surveys
confirm the negative impact of very high costs for taxes, litigation,
worker compensation, housing, health care and environmental
regulations. The split roll will turn one of the few positive features
of California's business tax climate to another major negative.
There is greatly increased activity by recruiters from other states
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attempting to move California's companies and jobs to their areas.
The split roll property tax is a corporate recruiter's dream for
states such as Texas, Nevada,
North Carolina
and others who have lower business
other expenses than
California-and they are quick to adverti this fact.
companies will
Faced with major tax increases, most
have one of only two options: for those companies that can do so,
raise prices (for food, rent, clothing, goods and services). In effect,
they will collect taxes through the price structure-which is
regressive and which hides the cost of government. The option to
raise prices is usually not available for companies that market
their products in a highly competitive worldwide market. Their
options are grim: to reduce employment, capital expenditures, or,
in many cases, move to another state with a more hospitable
business climate.
The split roll would, ironically, hit hardest those industries such
as aerospace and electronics that are now the priority targets of
out-of-state recruiters. It would raise taxes dramatically on the
companies that our state needs to provide employment into the
next century.
As noted in the report, the split roll concept, as implemented in
several other states, has only led to more splits in the tax rolls and
to more favorable treatment for certain classes of property. There
will be demands for special treatment for small business, for rental
property ("shelter deserves special treatment"), for agriculture,
for other favored commercial activities. The result: proliferation
of the property tax roll, as in Minnesota, which at one point had 31
classifications for special treatment. Minnesota's then tax commissioner told a 1970's tax group in California, "My advice for
states contemplating adopting the split roll is simple: don't do it."
And that is the advice of the authors of this statement to people
looking at the split roll as an "easy" way to raise billions: don't do
it.

lola Williams

The purpose of this statement is to confirm my overall support for
the Commission's report, and to emphasize an important clarification for recommendations one, two and three.
First, I am pleased to endorse the Commission's report as a whole,
and believe that it is constructive and reasonable in dealing with
a very complex problem. While there are many improvements
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offered by the Commission's recommendations, I am particularly
in support of the recommendations which propose that local voters
may change the local tax rate caps by a majority vote. This corrects
what I believe to be a major error in Proposition 13 which currently
denies a community the right to tax itself if it chooses to do so in
order to preserve or improve public services.
Second, I feel it is important to clarify the recommendations in the
report that propose to "Maintain revenue neutrality by lowering
(in the first and each subsequent year) the countywide tax rate ... to
a level which will generate an amount of revenue equal to the prior
year's revenue, adjusted for growth in population and an appropriate inflation index." More specifically, this concept is proposed as
recommendations l(c), 2(c), and 3(b).
There is a major problem with this concept as currently worded, in
that revenue growth, particularly from new development, would
effectively be averaged countywide rather than attributed to the
individual areas/communities within the county that experience
growth. Under this scenario, cities, school districts and special
districts within a particular county that allow development would
not receive a commensurate growth in revenue to provide services.
At the same time, areas within a county that are not experiencing
growth (by choice or circumstance) would receive the same level of
revenue growth as developing areas.
In order to avoid penalizing local governments that are experiencing growth, any adjustments for "revenue neutrality" must not be
revenue neutral from growth, only from inflation. Further, those
cities, school districts, and special districts within a county that
are experiencing growth should receive commensurate growth in
property tax revenue. In order to accomplish this, growth in
property tax revenue from new development should not be subject
to the "revenue-neutral" controls, or any adjustment factors should
include an upward adjustment for development.
In order to effectively deal with growth, the system must attribute
growth in property tax revenue from development to those jurisdictions that are accommodating the growth. A countywide
system will not work; this is why the impl~mentation of Proposition 13 was quickly changed from the countywide growth approach
of SB 154 that lasted for only one year, to the current AB 8
approach that attributes growth in assessed value to the individual tax rate areas within a county.
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APPENDIX A:
SENATE RESOLUTION 42 (HART)
BILL TEXT
AMENDED IN SENATE
AMENDED IN SENATE
INTRODUCED BY

MARCH 6, 1990
FEBRUARY 26, 1990

Senators Hart, Bergeson, Leroy Greene, Maddy, and Roberti
FEBRUARY 13, 1990

Relative to the creation of the Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and
Revenue
WHEREAS, In 1978, Californians enacted Proposition 13 which rolled back the
assessed value of property to values established in the 1975-76 fiscal year
limited growth in assessed value of property to 2 percent annually, require~
reassessment of property only upon change of ownership or new construction
and limited property tax paid to 1 percent of full cash value; and
'
WHEREAS, Since 1978, additional measures have been enacted which have
further limited the circumstances in which reassessment may occur; and
WHEREAS, The State of California is no longer in a period with unspent
General Fund surpluses; and
WHEREAS, The constitutionality of Proposition 13 is being challenged in
three court cases, based on the recent United States Supreme Court decision,
Allegheny Pitt. v. Webster Co., 488 u.s.
(109 s. Ct. 633, 102 L. Ed. 2d
688) which could result in the elimination of the assessment provision of
Proposition 13; and
WHEREAS, Immediately upon the passage of Proposition 13, disparities were
recognized in the treatment of homeowners and commercial property owners in
similar situations who had purchased homes at different time periods; and
WHEREAS, This disparity has increased over time, as established property
owners continue paying property taxes based on the 1975-76 value of their
property, while new property owners pay taxes based on the recent market value
of their property; and
WHEREAS, California's system of tax assessments may result in property tax
payments which fall heavily upon young families, many of whom already have
difficulty in purchasing the median priced California home, which in the third
quarter of 1989 sold for $200,933; and
WHEREAS, Home ownership is one of the economic foundations of this state;
and
WHEREAS, Similar disparities have developed for commercial property whereby
a change in ownership will dramatically change the competitive marketplace
with no resulting benefit to the economy; and
WHEREAS, Increased property tax burdens resulting from changes in ownership
in rental properties often result in increased rents which create additional
burdens on renters; and
WHEREAS, California's local governments and public schools are directly
affected by changes to the property taxation system; and
WHEREAS, Prior to Proposition 13 local agencies had their own independent
methods of financing local services; and
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WHEREAS, The authority to finance those services has shifted to the state,
causing local governments to lose the ability to deal with local problems; and
WHEREAS, State programs and policies required to be implemented at the
local level are consistently underfunded due to the lack of state and local
resources; now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate of the State of California, That the Senate
Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue is hereby created to study and
analyze the current system of property taxation, and develop proposals for
alternative methods of property taxation that maintain the basic protections
for homeowners promulgated in Proposition 13, adequately fund the provision of
essential public services by local government agencies, and reduce or
eliminate inequities currently experienced by property taxpayers in
California; and be it further
Resolved, That the commission shall recommend new intergovernmental
relationships which will more effectively allocate local and state financing
power and authority. The commission shall also recommend a reallocation of
public service responsibilities among local, state, and regional agencies; and
be it further
Resolved, That the Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue
shall include, but not be limited to, 15 members, all of whom shall be
appointed by the Senate Rules Committee. Members of the commission shall
include all of the following:
(1) One representative of county government.
(2) One representative of city government.
(3) One representative of special district government.
(4) one representative of school or community college district government.
(5) one county assessor.
(6) One legal scholar in the field of property taxation.
(7) Three Members of the Senate.
(8) Six public members; and be it further
Resolved, That the senate Committee on Rules shall appoint one of the
appointed members as Chair of the Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and
Revenue; and be it further
Resolved, That the State Board of Equalization and the Franchise Tax Board
shall provide technical assistance to the Senate Commission on Property Tax
Equity and Revenue; and be it further
Resolved, That the Sen~te Committee on Rules shall make funds available to
the Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue from the Senate
Operating Fund in an amount that the Senate Committee on Rules finds to be
necessary for the expenses of the commission in carrying out its duties. Any
proposed expenditures of these funds shall be approved by, and be in
compliance with policies set fo~th by, the Senate Committee on Rules; and be
it further
Resolved, That the Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenues
shall report its findings and recommendations to the Senate Committee on Rules
no later than one year from the date of the appointment of the members of the
commission; and be it further
Resolved, That the Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue
shall cease to exist as of January 31, 1991; and be it further
Resolved, That the Secretary of the Senate shall transmit copies of this
resolution to the Senate Committee on Rules, the League of California Cities,
the County Supervisors Association of California, the California Special
Districts Association, the California School Boards Association, the Franchise
Tax Board, and the Chair of the State Board of Equalization.
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SENATE RESOLUTION 8 (HART)
----·----~

BILL TEXT

INTRODUCED BY

Senators Hart, Ayala, and Bergeson
DECEMBER 4, 1990

Relative to the continuation of the Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity
and Revenue
WHEREAS, In 1978, Californians enacted Proposition 13 which rolled back the
assessed value of property to values established in the 1975-76 fiscal year,
limited growth in assessed value of property to 2 percent annually, required
reassessment of property only upon purchase, change of ownership, or new
construction, and limited property tax paid to 1 percent of full cash value;
and
WHEREAS, Since 1978, additional measures have been enacted which have
further limited the circumstances in which reassessment may occur; and
WHEREAS, The State of California is no longer in a period with unspent
General Fund surpluses; and
WHEREAS, The constitutionality of Proposition 13 is being challenged in
three court cases, based on the United States Supreme Court decision,
Allegheny Pitt. v. Webster co., 488 u.s. 336 (109 s. Ct. 633, 102 L. Ed. 2d
688), which could result in the elimination of the assessment provision of
Proposition 13; and
WHEREAS, Immediately upon the passage of Proposition 13, disparities were
recognized in the treatment of homeowners and commercial property owners in
similar situations who had purchased homes at different time periods; and
WHEREAS, This disparity has increased over time, as established property
owners continue paying property taxes based on the 1975-76 value of their
property, while new property owners pay taxes based on the recent market value
of their property; and
WHEREAS, California's system of tax assessments may result in property tax
payments which fall heavily upon young families, many of whom already have
difficulty in purchasing the median priced California home, which in the third
quarter of 1989 sold for $200,933; and
WHEREAS, Home ownership is one of the economic foundations of this state;
and
WHEREAS, Similar disparities have developed for commercial property whereby
a change in ownership will dramatically change the competitive marketplace
with no resulting benefit to the economy; and
WHEREAS, Increased property tax burdens resulting from changes in ownership
in rental properties often result in increased rents which create additional
burdens on renters; and
WHEREAS, California's local governments and public schools are directly
affected by changes to the property taxation system; and
WHEREAS, Prior to Proposition 13 local agencies had their own independent
methods of financing local services; and
WHEREAS, The authority to finance those services has shifted to the state,
causing local governments to lose the ability to deal with local problems; and
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WHEREAS, State programs and policies required to be implemented at the
local level are consistently underfunded due to the lack of state and local
resources; and
WHEREAS, The Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue was
created to study and analyze the current system of property taxation, and
develop proposals for alternative methods of property taxation that maintain
the basic protections for property owners promulgated in Proposition 13,
adequately fund the provision of essential public services by local government
agencies, and reduce or eliminate inequities currently experienced by property
taxpayers in California; and
WHEREAS, The commission has been empowered to recommend new
intergovernmental relationships which will more effectively allocate local and
state financing power and authority and to recommend a reallocation of public
service responsibilities among local, state, and regional agencies; and
WHEREAS, The Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue is
required to report its findings and recommendations to the Senate Committee on
Rules no later than one year from the date of the appointment of the members
of the commission; and
WHEREAS, The Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue shall
cease to exist as of January 31, 1991, which does not allow sufficient time
for completion of its important task; now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate of the State of California, That the Senate
Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue continue in existence until June
30, 1991, and as of that date shall cease to exist; and be it further
Resolved, That the Senate Committee on Rules shall make funds available to
the Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue from the Senate
Operating Fund in an amount that the Senate Committee on Rules finds to be
necessary for the expenses of the commission in carrying out its duties. Any
proposed expenditure of these funds shall be approved by, and be in compliance
with policies set forth by, the Senate Committee on Rules; and be it further
Resolved, That the Secretary of~the Senate shall transmit copies of this
resolution to the League of California Cities, the County Supervisors
Association of California, the California Special Districts Association, the
California School Boards Association, the Franchise Tax Board, and the Chair
of the State Board of Equalization.
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APPENDIX C:
SCHEDULE OF COMMISSION
POLICY MEETINGS
The Commission conducted six public meetings to receive testimony and options from tax
experts, scholars, state and local officials and citizen organizations.
June 25, 1990

Overview of Property Tax System

Assessment Procedures
Revenues
Current Legal Issues
Property Tax Equity
Local ~vernment Finance
School Finance
July 30, 1990

Property Tax Equity Issues

Equal Protection and Intergenerational Transfer
Property Tax Incidence (Ability to Pay)
Equitable Business Property Taxation
Assessment Methods and Options
August 27, 1990

Local Government and School Finance

Local Fiscal Capacity
Equalization of Local ~vernment Capacity
Realignment of State/Local Program Responsibility
AB 8 & Distributional Equity
School Finance

September 24, 1990

Property Tax Impact on Public Policy

Fiscalization of Land Use
Housing
Agriculture
Growth Management
Local ~vernance

November 14, 1990

Property Tax Systems: New Approaches, Options

California Tax Reform Association Proposal
Voter Revolt Proposal and Initiative

December 17, 1990

Property Tax Systems: New Approaches, Options

Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association Proposals
(4 proposals developed by scholars at the request of the
Jarvis Association)
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